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real estate there are many factors such as schools, roads, parks, and
surrounding property which may be properly considered although
there is no right in the property owner to have them maintained in
the condition then prevalent. Therefore, if evidence is introduced
that the availability of the permit land would effect market value, the
increase in value due to the permit must be determined. Thus in the
Jaramillo Case the trial court instructed the jury that it should give
to the fee land such additional value due to the availability of the
permit land as it thought necessary to be given. However, witnesses
for the ranchers were permitted to separately value the permit land
and add this to the value of the fee land. Because of this, the judgment was reversed, it being improper to separately appraise the
different elements constituting the whole.29 However, the court held
that the instructions given were proper and directed the trial court
to proceed in accordance with the views expressed in the opinion,
that is, to consider the availability of the permit land as an element of
value of the fee land provided that consideration be also given to
the fact that the permits could be withdrawn at any time without
obligation to compensate therefor.
Thus back in the district court Jaramillo will have to show the
value of the land as an economic unit. This could be done by showing
the carrying capacity of the ranch with the permit land and multiplying this figure by a peranimal unit value and then adding the
estimated value of the improvements. This was the method used in
the Cox Case. Then to show how much of this value he could get
in the open market because of the revocability of the permits he would
have to produce witnesses who could estimate the effect of the availability of the permit land on the value of the fee land in the open
market. Apparently the permits were usually not revoked and were
considered valuable in the open market because the dissenting opinion
in the Cox Case points out that the availability of permit lands had
been taken into consideration by buyers and sellers in that region for
many years.
Thus while these two cases did not place a value on the effect of a
revocable license on the land benefited thereby, the ruling in the
Jaramillo Case laid the groundwork for future cases doing so.
JOHN GROGAN

Evidence-When Is Fact of Prior Criminal Offense Admissible
to Show Common Scheme-Defendants, members and employees of
Union Local No. 65, were charged with obstructing an officer who
29

United States v. Meyer, 113 F. 2d 387, 397 (7th Cir. 1940).
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was attempting to make an arrest, and for assaulting and beating an
officer. The crimes charged occured during the picketing, by Local
#65, of a retail store. In-the trial court evidence was received, without objection by the defendants, to the effect that Local #65 was
communist, dominated, and, for that reason, had been expelled from
the C.I.O.; that two of; the five, defendants were, connected with
various communist activities., On appeal the defendants contended that
this evidence was .incompetent, irrelev ant, highly, prejudicial and
caused.severe artagonism against them. The State contended that
eyen if the defendants had objected to the- evidence in the trial court,
thatit wouldhave been, dmissible, to prove motive, design, plan, or
scheme; and that their acquiescence to the evidence in the trial court
prevented, their raising. the -question on appeal. Held: Whether the
defendants are members -of. the communist party; or adhere to its
doctrines is akmatter entirely foreign, to the, issue, of guilt or innocence ,on a charge of 'affray, assault and, battery,- and obstructing -an
officer while attempting to make an,arrest. Commonwealth v. Peay,
85,A. 2d 4,25 (Ra, 1951)..,,-,
The majority opinion- in the instant case seems to base its decision
on the :theory that the evidence regarding the communist issue was
completely irrelevant and foreign to the issue; i.e. that such evidence
could in-no way,-be-of: probative value in determining whether the
defendants actually, did or.did not,assault.the officer. The majority
opinion also concerns itself With the fact that the testimony in question undoubtedly created undue prejudice against the defendants' It
was said that, the tendency of human nature to punish the defendant
becahse he, isa bad man generally regardless of the merits of the case,
is a tendency which cannot fail to influence the jury. The majority
opinion disposes of the State's primary contention by holding that the
law pertaining to design, -pattern, system, and 'common scheme could
not come into.play until there, was proof that the Union Local #65,
and the- two individual defendants, were guilty in other instances of
committing assault and battery as communists.
The minority in the instant case held that evidence tending to
prove motive, design, plan, or scheme of criminal conduct is always
admissible; that the Pennsylvania court had previously taken judicial
notice of the fact that the Communist Party is a subversive organization which conspires to teach and advocate the overthrow of the
government of the United States by force and violence;3 that, therefore, the evidence should be admissible as tending to show a design
.

1 WHARTON, CnIMINAL EVIDENCE §227 (11th ed. 1935), for an interesting discussion of the principle of undue prejudice.
21 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §57 (3rd ed. 1940).
3 Milasinovich v. Serbian Progressive Club, Inc., 84 A2d 571 (Pa. 1951).
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or plan to do the act in question. It is established law that when the
very doing of the act charged is still to be proved, one of the evidential facts receivable is the person's design or plan to do it.4 A
defendant's situation, conduct, speech, silence, and motives may be
considered if they have some connection with each other, as a part
5
of the same plan or induced by the same motive.
It would appear from the majority opinion that they are basing
their decision on the assumption that the evidence in question does
not logically "tend" to prove the conclusion for which it was admitted.
For evidence of another crime to be admissible to prove motive it is
necessary that it fairly6 and directly7 tends to prove a motive growing
out of the collateral crime;8 there must be a "natural reasonable
sequence" 9 or a "visible connection" 10 between the two. At this time
a distinction should be made between intent and design. "In proving
intent the act is conceded or assumed; what is sought is the state of
mind that accompanied it. In proving design the act is still undetermined, and the proof is of a working plan, operating towards the
future with such force as to render probable both the act and the
accompanying state of mind."" Mere similarity of acts is admissible
to prove intention, or to negate an innocent intention, but when the
effort is to establish a definite prior design or system, then an additional element must be satisfied, namely, that there must be not merely
a similarity in the results, but such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused
by a general plan of which they are the individual manifestations. 2
With this in mind it would appear that the evidence in question does
not adequately "tend" to convince the human mind that defendants
actually assaulted the officer. The case might have been different if
the cause of action was for unlawfully picketing, since in such a case
the connection between the two factors would be more closely allied.
On the other hand, however, there is some authority for the
proposition that evidence is admissible to show that a defendant is a
42 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

§304 (3rd ed. 1940).

5 Commonwealth v. Robinson, 146 Mass. 571, 16 N.E. 452 (1888); People v.
Stout, 4 Park.Cr.Cas. 127 (N.Y., 1858).
6 State v. Hakon, 21 N.D. 133, 129 N.W. 234 (1910).
7People v. Cook, 148 Cal. 334, 83 P. 43 (1906).
s People v. Glass, 158 Cal. 650, 112 P. 281 (1910) where the court said that,
"The motive for the commission of the crime charged must grow out of the
collateral crime .... It is not sufficient that both crimes spring from the same
motive."
9 Commonwealth v. Vardelle, 70 Pa.Super. 241 (1918).
10 Shaffner v. Commonwealth, 72 Pa. 60 (1873). On p. 65 the court said, "To
make one criminal act evidence of another, a connection between them must
have existed in the mind of the actor, linking them together for some purpose
he intended to accomplish."
11 2 WIGoRE, EVIDENCE §300 (3rd ed. 1940).
12 2 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §304 (3rd ed. 1940).
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member of a secret organization dedicated to the attainment of unlawful objectives. 1 3 The underlying theory for this rule is to allow the
jury to draw the inference that since the defendant is a member of
such an organization it is reasonably probable that he would have
a motive or purpose for committing the crime charged, and therefore
the conclusion to be drawn would be that the defendant, with reason4
able probability, was guilty of the crime charged.1
In Wisconsin the general rule of law is followed disallowing evidence of a prior offense by the accused,' 5 ostensively submitted to
show guilt of the crime charged, but such evidence is admissible when
the prior offense directly tends to prove some element of the crime
charged.' 6 The test to determine the competency of the evidence was
given in the Spick case where the court said that the trial court must
admit the evidence if (1) the evidence logically and reasonably tends
to prove a fact in issue, and (2) there is a reasonable probability of
the truthfulness of the evidence to be admitted ;17 and the fact that the
evidence is circumstantial,' or may be prejudicial,' 9 is no ground for
so as to
its exclusion. If there is a connection between the two acts
20
show "plan, design and intent! the evidence is admissible.
In this writer's opinion it would appear that the Wisconsin court,
if confronted with an analogous situation, would follow the principle
of the Spick case 2' and would concur with the majority in the instant
case.
FINTAN

M.

FLANAGAN

Future Interests-Construction of Conveyance to "A and His
Children"-Rule in Wild's Case-Certain land had been deeded by a
grantor to his wife and their children. At the time the deed took effect
the grantor and his wife had five living children, but another child was
subsequently born. After the wife's death, condemnation proceedings
'13 Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 157 Ky. 544, 180 S.W. 961 (1915); Carroll v.
Commonwealth, 84- Pa. 107 (1877); Campbell v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. 187
(1877); Hester v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. 138 (1877); McManus v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. 57 (1879).
-4Commonwealth v. Fragassa, 278 Pa. 1, 122 A. 88 (1923).
15 Ablricht v. State, 6 Wis. 74 (1857); Schaser v. State, 36 Wis. 429 (1874);

State v. Miller, 47 Wis. 530, 3 N.W. 31 (1879) ; McAllister v. State, 112 Wis.

496, 88 N.W. 212 (1901) ; Malone v. State, 192 Wis. 379, 212 N.W. 879 (1927);
State v. Henger, 220 Wis. 410, 264 N.W. 922 (1936).
16 Zoldoske v. State, 82 Wis. 580, 52 N.W. 778 (1892) ; Fossdahl v. State, 89 Wis.
482, 62 N.W. 185 (1895) ; Paulson v. State, 118 Wis. 89, 94 N.W. 771 (1903) ;
Dietz v. State, 149 Wis. 462, 136 N.W. 166 (1912); Magnuson v. State, 187
Wis. 122, 203 N.W. 749 (1925) ; State v. Meating, 202 Wis. 47, 231 N.W. 263
(1930).
17 Spick v. State, 140 Wis. 104, 121 N.W. 664 (1909).
is Ibid.; Schwantes v. State, 127 Wis. 160, 106 N.W. 237 (1906).
'19 Herde v. State, 236 Wis. 408, 295 N.W. 684 (1941).
20 Ibid.

